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Helpful, Easy to Carry; Phonetics could be better
don't go to Thailand without it
HELPFULL

Reporting facts
Good Read, But Be Aware.....I was with the 9th Infantry Division approximately the same time. In fact, I know many of the same places Mr. Tripp refers to in his book. Who knows, maybe he and I shared C-rations at some point. I also know that Mr. Tripp's description of the 9th Division and the Division Snipers in particular, although written from his perspective and with literary license, and meant to be compelling, is also unfair and plays into the hands of those who called us 'baby killers' and 'killing machines'.
We were young men, 18 years old and in combat for the first time. For most of us, it was not about proving one's self, or fighting the internal war with families and other bagage. It was about getting through the day without getting killed. Mr. Tripp has provided us with some gutsy descriptions of that emotion, I only wish it was not at the expense of other GI's who shared the same battleground, we were not all automatons nor were we without our own feelings of guilt, regardless of origin.
A great, artistic read

ReadableAs a university student who read this book to complement a research paper, I was disapppointed. Although very reader-friendly, Warner's style also verges on fiction and it is difficult to separate true fact from his interpretations of events. In such a book, this may be unavoidable, given that he attempts to plop the reader down into Laos of the late 1960's and 1970's. Warner does his job in that sense, but in doing so he blurs the line between fact and fiction. Moreover, I find that he often glosses over events and writes in a very American style, sometimes very dismissive of the Lao and Meo peoples. However, if you are looking for a "real life" wartime Communism vs. Capitalism cliffhanger, then Shooting at the Moon should fulfill that role quite nicely. For more thoroughly researched and more comprehensive books on Lao history, including the Lao Revolution, I would recomend Arthur J. Dommen's Laos: Keystone of Indochina and anything by Martin Stuart-Fox.
Failed Strategies
Bullseye for Shooting At The Moon

Excellent introduction to East Timor tragedyThis edition was published some months before the orgy of murder and terror of last September and thus the author did not have the opportunity to bring the story full circle.
Must read for anyone interested in PoliticsI read it from cover to cover during the one hour flight and even though I was already familiar with the basic history of East Timor, the book informed me in a concise and well written manner, condensing the essense of that tragic history into a few dozen pages........I strongly recommend that anyone interested in what is happening on this planet read this book.
A great introduction

Better books have been written on the topic.Much of this has already been well known, and has been detailed by such writers as Gareth Porter, Seymour Hersh and most recently Jeffrey Kimball in Nixon's Vietnam War. Berman argues something new however. Nixon and Kissinger claimed that they had won a viable agreement which was undermined by Watergate. The collapse of presidential authority let a cowardly Congress ruin their farsighted policy and allow the North to win. By contrast, their many critics claim that Nixon and Kissinger had obtained nothing but a "decent interval," allowing them to extricate themselves knowing that the North would conquer them in a few years.
Berman, by contrast, argues that what Nixon and Kissinger really wanted was a peace agreement that they knew the North would violate. Once they did they could invoke American airpower aggressively and continually until the end of Nixon's term. The agreement was nothing but a sham, only a necessary stage in producing what would be a new Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I am skeptical about this argument. First off, it only really appears in the last 100 pages of the book. The statements that Berman cites from Nixon, Kissinger and Haig can be interpreted in a variety of ways. It could be self-delusion, especially on Nixon's part. It could be simple belligerence designed to buck up their south east Asian allies and their own anti-communist beliefs.
The second weakness with the argument arises from the deal itself. The United States had already conceded a Northern military presence in the South, the essential unity of the country, and some form of NLF presence in the government. Given these concessions it would be tricky to argue that the North had broken them and then get from Congress the blank cheque to attack them. Even more problematic was the fact that the United States and the South also violated the agreement. Thieu had no interest in any kind of national reconciliation, and Berman himself admits that the United States violated the agreement by transferring bases to the South. Berman also notes that neither Kissinger nor Thieu wished to free the thousands of political prisoners in the South. The key point is that if both Thieu and Nixon violated the agreement, they could not reasonably expect to mobilize Congressional support when the North did.
There are other weaknesses in Berman's book. The book is poorly annotated, which becomes increasingly irritating as one goes further into the books and where one wonders what the source of Berman's statements are. It is really appalling that publishers are allowed to show such contempt for endnotes and footnotes. Berman does have access to new documents, but there is a tendency to overquote them. This gives the book a "cut and paste" tendency. Most serious of all is Berman's treatment of the military situation and his attitude towards the Thieu regime. It is less South Vietnam, let alone Vietnam, but the Thieu regime who is viewed as betrayed. Berman's book insinuates that by withdrawing on these terms, Nixon and Kissinger doomed Thieu to inevitable conquest.
Thieu's defeat was probably inevitable, but not for the reasons that Berman suggests. He quotes the right wing critics of the deal, like Admirals Zumwalt and Moorer and Ambassador Negroponte. But he does not explain why Vietnamization failed to rebuild or reinforce the Southern Army. He does mention that the NLF rallied remarkably after the 1972 Easter Offensive (other scholars think they rallied even earlier) but he says little more about them. But as Arnold Isaacs pointed out in his invaluable Without Honor, the South Vietnamese Army always had enough arms to defend itself. Before the final offensive it had the third largest navy in the world and it had twice as many tanks as its enemies. As late as 1974 when already guerilla forces were weakening it, it outshot the enemy by a margin of 60 to 1. What the ARVN lacked of course, was an army with leaders who were honest or competent or courageous (anyone of these qualities would have worked) and an infantry who were willing to fight for their causes. For this failure Thieu was especially responsible, as were for that matter his disgruntled and belligerent countrymen.
FantasticThe sad fact is the agreements hammered out in Paris in January of 1973 was roughly identical to what the Johnson Administration was offering to put on the table had peace talks broken out in October 1968. The only difference was by January 1973, the toll in Vietnam had risen to roughly 52,000 American dead. No peace, no honor, indeed.
Professor Berman has written a great book and it should be on the desks of every college student studying how presidential decision-making impacts the foreign arena.
Nixon's Vietnam Duplicity"No Peace, No Honor" is the logical sequel to Larry Berman's earlier penetrating work, "Planning a Tragedy," which was a fascinating look inside the Johnson Administration and the mindset which brought about America's entry into the Vietnam conflict. Robert McNamara, despite his earlier assurances, proved to be a naive administrator, making mistake upon mistake in forcing America into an ever deepening hawkish posture. The wise counsel of State Department operative George Ball, who provided the beneficial hindsight input of French president Charles DeGaulle, whose country fought a war in Indo China between 1946 and 1954, was unfortunately spurned.
With Johnson gone and the Nixon Administration taking over in January of 1969, the scene is set for Berman's latest work. Taking advantage of recently declassified government documents, Berman presents a chaotic scene in which Nixon and Kissinger seek to find a way out of the Vietnam morass without conveying the impression that the U.S. was running out on an ally and leaving it vulnerably exposed to a successful Communist insurgency. Despite ferocious bombing, Nixon was ultimately confronted with a situation wherein public support for the war in America had reached its lowest level while his anticipated strategy of helping build Vietnam's fighting forces into a team formidable enough to hold off the insurgency from the North had notably failed. As a result, Nixon sought to convince Americans that the agreement he was able to achieve embodied "Peace With Honor" when Communist troops remained in place in the South, prepared to finish the job and achieve a unified Vietnam. Debate had persisted over the years over whether Nixon and Kissinger were aware of what ultimately would transpire, and that the agreement signed and put into place was nothing other than a facade meant to disguise an ultimate result of which they were well aware. The documents unearthed by Berman demonstrate an awareness of Nixon and Kissinger of the tragic nature of circumstances and the inevitability of a Communist triumph.
William Hare


A good book, but not enough pictures
Definitive guide to the Angkor temples
Essential Guide

A short history of the Balkans.I picked up a few themes from his book. One was that Ottomon Empire and the some of the Communist regimes papered over the ethnic differences. At the same time, the ethnic differences were not a big deal for most of the time in the Balkans. Neither were the religious differences, as the population tended to chose what parts of the various practices to follow.
For me, this was not a particularly interesting read. At slighty over a hundred pages, one would assume you could breeze through this book. But the writing and the words used, resulted in me taking six and a half hours to read this book. There are more interesting books out there including Misha Glenny with his The Balkans. I would probably consult that book if I wanted information.
Concise, Clearly Written & ComprehensiveErika B. (erikab93)
Enlightening!

A helpful start, but patchy sometimes vague coverage
Out of date but still usefulUnfortunately, the book IS out of date. While originally published in the early 80s, it looks more like the early 70s. If I were the author, I would make a serious attempt at revamping the whole thing. I felt like I was reading an old National Geographic.
More than a guidebook, gives an inside look at the Thais

Excellent
Stories of the soul
A sad story.This is the story of a revolution going haywire and of ruthless men who, in the name of distorted and senseless ideologies, inflicted pain, fear, terror, and death on their countrymen.
Power not backed by strong moral values could only lead to barbarism.


easy reading
an overview of the history of cambodia in the last 30 years
An informative account